Mad, bad and dangerous to know

Analysis 72 (2):314-316 (2012)
Tracking accounts of knowledge formulated in terms of counterfactuals suffer from well known problems. Examples are provided, and it is shown that moving to a dispositional tracking theory of knowledge avoids three of these problems
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Stephen T. Davis (2004). The Mad/Bad/God Trilemma. Faith and Philosophy 21 (4):480-492.
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2007). Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.

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