Meeting Floridi's challenge to artificial intelligence from the knowledge-game test for self-consciousness

Metaphilosophy 41 (3):292-312 (2010)
Abstract: In the course of seeking an answer to the question "How do you know you are not a zombie?" Floridi (2005) issues an ingenious, philosophically rich challenge to artificial intelligence (AI) in the form of an extremely demanding version of the so-called knowledge game (or "wise-man puzzle," or "muddy-children puzzle")—one that purportedly ensures that those who pass it are self-conscious. In this article, on behalf of (at least the logic-based variety of) AI, I take up the challenge—which is to say, I try to show that this challenge can in fact be met by AI in the foreseeable future.
Keywords knowledge game  self‐consciousness  consciousness  artificial intelligence
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.

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