Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):111 – 125 (1984)
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Might All Normativity Be Queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
Michael Rubin (2008). Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307 - 327.

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