Graduate studies at Western
Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):207-219 (2006)
|Abstract||Supposing you were convinced by certain radical skeptical arguments that many of your beliefs were not justifiably believed by you, what stance could/should you adopt with regard to those skeptically-problematized beliefs? This paper explores a range of possible reactions, aiming to be reasonably comprehensive in coverage though admittedly suggestive rather than decisive in its treatment of each individual reaction. In considering this variety of responses we begin to see suggestive intimations of the ways in which radical skepticism could represent a threat to our notions of cognitive self-mastery.|
|Keywords||akrasia belief skepticism self-control self-mastery|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Arthur F. Walker (1989). The Problem of Weakness of Will. Noûs 23 (5):653-676.
Martin Lin (2006). Spinoza's Account of Akrasia. Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3):395-414.
Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1:18-25.
David Owens (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist 85 (3):381 - 397.
David Owens (2002). Epistemic Akrasia. The Monist 85 (3):381-397.
Alfred R. Mele (1988). Irrationality: A Precis. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):173-177.
Brian Ribeiro (2002). Epistemological Skepticism(s) and Rational Self-Control. The Monist 85 (3):468-477.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads11 ( #107,531 of 739,697 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,697 )
How can I increase my downloads?