Journal of Philosophy 77 (7):381-401 (1980)
The article explicates a notion of prudence according to which an agent acts prudently if he acts so as to satisfy not only his present preferences, but his past and future preferences as well. A simplified decision-theoretic framework is developed within which three analyses of prudence are presented and compared. That analysis is defended which can best handle cases in which an agent's present act will affect his future preferences.
Keywords Decision  Ethics  Preference  Prudence
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DOI 10.2307/2025536
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Donald W. Bruckner (2011). Silent Prudence. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):349-364.

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