David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 189 (1):1-10 (2012)
Philosophers often talk about the things we say, or believe, or think, or mean. The things are often called ‘propositions’. A proposition is what one believes, or thinks, or means when one believes, thinks, or means something. Talk about propositions is ubiquitous when philosophers turn their gaze to language, meaning and thought. But what are propositions? Is there a single class of things that serve as the objects of belief, the bearers of truth, and the meanings of utterances? How do our utterances express propositions? Under what conditions do two speakers say the same thing, and what (if anything) does this tell us about the nature of propositions? There is no consensus on these questions—or even on whether propositions should be treated as things at all. During the second Propositions and Same-Saying workshop, which took place on July 19–21 2010 at the University of Sydney, philosophers debated these (and related) questions. The workshop covered topics in the philosophy of language, perception, and metaphysics. The present volume contains revised and expanded versions of the papers presented at the workshop.
|Keywords||Propositions Same-saying Content Compositional semantics Impossible worlds Possible worlds Truthmaking|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
David K. Lewis (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Willard van Orman Quine (1996). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Citations of this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2015). Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):757-768.
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