Persons, ontology, methodology, values

So-called “Wide Psychological Reductionism”, and similar neo-Lockean views of personal identity, are both important and popular. Yet they seem to demand of their adherents commitment to controversial views both in ontology and in philosophical methodology. The consequent debates interweave methodological, ontological, and evaluative issues in interesting ways. We will examine some of these issues, and explore some of the more recent developments and transformations which Psychological views have led to. The focus will be selective and we will look only at a small selection from the prolific literature which has grown up around this topic.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Matti Eklund (2009). Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press 130--56.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
Penelope Maddy (1995). Naturalism and Ontology. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3):248-270.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

39 ( #84,314 of 1,725,580 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #110,437 of 1,725,580 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.