Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism

Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316 (2003)
Abstract
Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
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DOI 10.1086/377409
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Paul E. Griffiths (2007). The Phenomena of Homology. Biology and Philosophy 22 (5):643-658.
Carl Brusse (2016). Planets, Pluralism, and Conceptual Lineage. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 53:93-106.

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