David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43 (2010)
Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains why these different aspects (including discovery) can be rational without conforming to formal schemes, and why scientific reasoning is local, i.e., justified only in certain domains and contingent on particular empirical facts. The notion of material inference also fruitfully interacts with accounts of conceptual change and psychological theories of concepts
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
Ian Hacking (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.
Philip Kitcher (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions. Oxford University Press.
Gregory L. Murphy (2004). The Big Book of Concepts. The MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Stathis Psillos (2015). Evidence: Wanted, Alive or Dead. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):357-381.
Julian Reiss (2012). Causation in the Sciences: An Inferentialist Account. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (4):769-777.
John R. Shook (2016). Abduction, Complex Inferences, and Emergent Heuristics of Scientific Inquiry. Axiomathes 26 (2):157-186.
Jan Derry (2013). Can Inferentialism Contribute to Social Epistemology? Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):222-235.
Julian Reiss (2012). Causation in the Sciences: An Inferentialist Account. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (4):769-777.
Similar books and articles
Alan C. Love (2012). Formal and Material Theories in Philosophy of Science: A Methodological Interpretation. In Henk W. de Regt (ed.), Epsa Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer 175--185.
P. D. Magnus (2008). Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303 – 315.
Igor Douven (2002). Testing Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 130 (3):355-377.
John D. Norton (2003). A Material Theory of Induction. Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Alexander Bird (2009). Inductive Knowledge. In D. Pritchard (ed.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge
Mark Day & George S. Botterill (2008). Contrast, Inference and Scientific Realism. Synthese 160 (2):249 - 267.
Gregory W. Dawes (2013). Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation. Ratio 26 (1):62-78.
James Blachowicz (1989). Discovery and Ampliative Inference. Philosophy of Science 56 (3):438-462.
Added to index2009-08-18
Total downloads170 ( #21,720 of 1,911,313 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #29,419 of 1,911,313 )
How can I increase my downloads?