The Elusive Experience of Agency
Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267 (2011)
| Abstract | I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against actual sensory feedback are also coded in a perceptual representational format | |||||||||
| Keywords | Motor control Agentive experience Forward models Comparators | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesTim Bayne (2011). The Sense of Agency. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives.
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Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.
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