The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69 (1999)
| Abstract | Is it true that if zombies-creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions | |||||||||
| Keywords | Computation Metaphysics Mind Zombie | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesDavid Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.
Selmer Bringsjord (1999). The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41 - 69.
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