The zombie attack on the computational conception of mind

Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions
Keywords Computation  Metaphysics  Mind  Zombie
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DOI 10.2307/2653457
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Colin Hales (2011). On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):55-89.

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