Graduate studies at Western
Analysis 61 (3):213-24 (2001)
|Abstract||McKinsey-style reductio arguments aim to show that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access, the claim that a subject can have a priori knowledge of her thought contents. I defend my version of the reductio against the objections of Falvey, and McLaughlin and Tye. However, I raise and discuss a more serious objection--that it may be difficult for a subject to know a priori that she is agnostic about a concept, given that agnosticism involves being unsure whether a concept applies to things of a certain type when there is a determinate fact whether or not the concept so applies|
|Keywords||A Priori agnosticism Epistemology Individualism Knowledge|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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