Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

Mind 119 (476):883 - 905 (2010)
It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects — namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle
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DOI 10.2307/23012194
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PhilPapers Archive Jeffrey E. Brower, Aristotelian Endurantism: A New Solution to the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
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References found in this work BETA
Toomas Karmo (1977). Disturbances. Analysis 37 (4):147 - 148.

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Michael C. Rea (2011). Hylomorphism Reconditioned. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
Ross Inman (2014). Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597.

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