David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 119 (476):883 - 905 (2010)
It is standardly assumed that there are three — and only three — ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favoured by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects — namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle
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References found in this work BETA
Sally Haslanger (1989). Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 49 (3):119-125.
Toomas Karmo (1977). Disturbances. Analysis 37 (4):147 - 148.
David Lewis (1988). Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe. Analysis 48 (2):65-72.
David Lewis (2002). Tensing the Copula. Mind 111 (441):1-14.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael C. Rea (2011). Hylomorphism Reconditioned. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):341-358.
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