Online research in philosophy

In Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland, and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analyzed by the leading thinkers in the field.

The book makes a direct contribution to the connection between phenomenology and cognitive science.

The current orthodoxy on mental representation can be characterized in terms of three
central ideas. The first is ontological, the second semantic, and the third methodological. After
elucidating those, I argue that the emerging picture of mental representation is satisfactory only as
an account of mental representation at the sub-personal level. It is unsatisfactory, in a principled
way, as an account of mental representation at the personal level.