Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values

In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 98--120 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Are intentions reasons?John Brunero - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444.
Reasons and Intentions.Bruno Verbeek (ed.) - 2007 - Ashgate.
Incommensurable values.John Broome - 2000 - In Roger Crisp & Brad Hooker (eds.), Well-Being and Morality: Essays in Honour of James Griffin. Clarendon Press. pp. 21--38.
Incommensurability and moral value.Mark R. Reiff - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):237-268.
The impossibility of incommensurable values.Chris Kelly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):369 - 382.
Intrinsic values and reasons for action.Ralph Wedgwood - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):342-363.
Reason in action.John Gibbons - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 72.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-30

Downloads
139 (#130,357)

6 months
25 (#111,691)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Broome
University Of Oxford

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Grit.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.
Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.

View all 65 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references