Adapt or die: The death of invariantism?

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285 (2005)
Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of assertion. I argue that DeRose's new argument does not rule out either of the two forms of invariantism, classic and subject-sensitive invariantism. Further, I argue against DeRose that an invariantist can explain the context-sensitivity of assertion.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00398.x
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
Peter Baumann (2011). WAMs: Why Worry? Philosophical Papers 40 (2):155 - 177.

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