Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality

Philosophical Review 117 (2):193 - 243 (2008)
This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/40606017
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive Jeffrey Brower, Aquinas on Mental Representation: Concepts and Intentionality
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Lionel Shapiro (2012). Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):378-418.
Ross Inman (2014). Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude. Philosophical Studies 168 (3):583-597.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

87 ( #38,329 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,688 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.