Philosophical Review 117 (2):193-243 (2008)
|Abstract||This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ard Van Moer (2006). The Intentionality of Formal Systems. Foundations of Science 11 (1-2).
Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott (2006). Splitting Concepts. Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.
Stephen P. Stich (ed.) (1994). Mental Representation: A Reader. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Stuart Silvers (ed.) (1989). Representation: Readings In The Philosophy Of Mental Representation. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Susan Brower-Toland (forthcoming). How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment. In G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
Uriah Kriegel (2012). Personal-Level Representation. Protosociology 28:77-114.
Thomas Williams (2005). Aquinas in Dialogue with Contemporary Philosophy. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 79 (3):483-491.
Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
Susan Brower-Toland (2007). Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads54 ( #18,785 of 549,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?