Applied relativism and Davidson's arguments against conceptual schemes

The Science of Mind 49:221-240 (2011)
This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "Applied Relativisms", i.e. theories of conceptual relativism found outside philosophy such as Whorf's. These theories make no metaphysical claims, which Davidson seems to assume. Ultimately, the misunderstanding (and resulting strawman argument) illustrates (the effect of) differences in conceptual schemes more than that it undermines it.
Keywords Donald Davidson  conceptual schemes  relativism
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