Abstract

The goal of the dissertation is to sketch an account of the nature of belief states. Chapter One introduces a distinction between belief states and objects of belief. The objects of belief are propositions; belief states are intrinsic states of the believer. Examples from the current literature show that one's belief states do not by themselves determine which propositions are objects of one's belief. ;In Chapter Two I argue that the objects of belief may be divided into what I call "immediate" and "mediate" objects of belief. To one's total immediate object of belief there corresponds a property which characterizes one's belief state essentially and completely. ;A theory of belief should say how intrinsic properties of an individual determine what the individual's immediate objects of belief are, and how one's immediate objects of belief in conjunction with facts about one's circumstances determine what one's mediate objects of belief are. I address the former question in Chapter Two and the latter in Chapter Four. ;Chapter Three defends, against certain, mainly epistemological, objections, an account of the semantics of belief sentences according to which e.g. 'Joe believes that grass is green' attributes to Joe as object of his belief the proposition that grass is green. ;Chapter Five suggests that the distinction between mediate and immediate objects of belief is helpful in thinking about such issues as Kripke's puzzle about belief, whether there can be contingent knowledge a priori, and whether we believe the logical consequences of our beliefs