Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67 (1993)
|Abstract||The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action|
|Keywords||Belief Content Epistemology Knowledge|
|Through your library||Configure|
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