Chunk and permeate, a paraconsistent inference strategy. Part I: The infinitesimal calculus

Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (4):379-388 (2004)
In this paper we introduce a paraconsistent reasoning strategy, Chunk and Permeate. In this, information is broken up into chunks, and a limited amount of information is allowed to flow between chunks. We start by giving an abstract characterisation of the strategy. It is then applied to model the reasoning employed in the original infinitesimal calculus. The paper next establishes some results concerning the legitimacy of reasoning of this kind - specifically concerning the preservation of the consistency of each chunk and concludes with some other possible applications and technical questions
Keywords Philosophy
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DOI 10.1023/B:LOGI.0000036831.48866.12
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References found in this work BETA
P. K. Schotch & R. E. Jennings (1980). Inference and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):327-340.

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Inoue Kazumi (2014). Dialectical Contradictions and Classical Formal Logic. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (2):113-132.
Bryson Brown (forthcoming). Peter Vickers: Understanding Inconsistent Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-6.

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