David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435 (2006)
Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, and so try to accommodate these intuitions even on an invariantist view. DeRose (Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 1998; Philosophical Review, 2002) argues that any such 'warranted assertibility manoeuvre', or 'WAM', against contextualism is unlikely to succeed. Here, I argue that his objections to a WAM against contextualism are not persuasive and offer a pragmatic account of the data about ascriptions of knowledge
|Keywords||Cohen Contextualism DeRose warranted assertibility manoeuvres|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
John Hawthorne (2004). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
H. P. Grice (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press.
D. Sperber & D. Wilson (1995). Relevance. Blackwell.
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe (2012). Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed. Noûs 46 (4):675-708.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2013). Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them). Philosophy Compass 8 (2):170-185.
Jennifer Wright (2010). On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
Michael Hannon (2015). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):116-139.
Jonathan Schaffer (2006). The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 127 (1):87-107.
Similar books and articles
Federico Luzzi (2011). Contextualism and Counter-Closure. Dialectica 66 (1):187-199.
Jessica Brown (2005). Williamson on Luminosity and Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):319–327.
Leo Iacono (2008). Warranted Assertability Maneuvers and the Rules of Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.
Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
Jessica Brown (2005). Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
Keith DeRose (2009). The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1. OUP Oxford.
Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Martijn Blaauw (2003). WAMming Away at Contextualism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):88-97.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads204 ( #6,173 of 1,725,443 )
Recent downloads (6 months)18 ( #44,304 of 1,725,443 )
How can I increase my downloads?