Carruthers on the deficits of animals
Psyche 5 (23) (1999)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
William G. Lycan (1999). A Response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. Psyche 5 (11).
Dale W. Jamieson & Marc Bekoff (1992). Carruthers on Nonconscious Experience. Analysis 52 (1):23-28.
Koen Lamberts (2001). Category-Specific Deficits and Exemplar Models. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):484-485.
David Jehle & Uriah Kriegel (2006). An Argument Against Dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.
Luca Malatesti, Forum on Peter, Carruthers. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Forum 2 SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review.
Michael Lyvers (1999). Who has Subjectivity? Psyche 5 (31).
Adam Shriver & Colin Allen (2005). Consciousness Might Matter Very Much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-22.
William S. Robinson (1997). Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense. Biology and Philosophy 12 (1):51-71.
Peter Carruthers (1992). The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge University Press.
Robert W. Lurz (1999). Animal Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):149-168.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads20 ( #61,589 of 549,196 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,196 )How can I increase my downloads? |

