David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354 (2006)
Virtue reliabilism appears to have a major advantage over generic reliabilism: only the former has the resources to explain the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that this appearance is illusory. It is sustained only by the misguided assumption that a principled distinction can be drawn between those belief-forming methods that are grounded in the agent’s intellectual virtues, and those that are not. A further problem for virtue reliabilism is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere justified true belief. I argue that virtue reliabilism lacks the resources to explain this value difference. I conclude by considering what it would take for a theory to explain the extra value of knowledge over mere justified true belief
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Duncan Pritchard (2009). Review: Apt Performance and Epistemic Value. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 143 (3):407 - 416.
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Wayne Davis & Christoph Jäger (2012). Reliabilism and the Extra Value of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):93-105.
Christian Piller (2009). Valuing Knowledge: A Deontological Approach. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413 - 428.
Jared Bates (2013). Damming the Swamping Problem, Reliably. Dialectica 67 (1):103-116.
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