Direct and indirect belief

The word 'belief' is ambiguous, referring sometimes to what is believed, sometimes to the act or state of believing it. I believe that as I write this it is sunny outside. This belief is true. What is true is what I believe, namely that it is sunny, not my believing it. On the other hand, my belief that it is sunny is rational and unshakeable, and it played a causal role in my deciding not to wear a coat today. What is rational, unshakeable, and played a causal role is my believing a certain thing, not the thing I believe. I will say that what I believe is an object of belief , and that my believing it is a belief state
Keywords Being  Belief  Consciousness  Mental States  Metaphysics
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DOI 10.2307/2107937
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Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29-55.
Neil Feit (2001). Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.

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