Do dolphins know their own minds?

Biology and Philosophy 19 (4):633-53 (2004)
  Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins
Keywords Dolphin  Metacognition  Science  Self-knowledge  States Of Mind
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DOI 10.1007/sBIPH-004-0928-1
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References found in this work BETA
A. Whiten & R. W. Byrne (1988). Tactical Deception in Primates. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):233.
G. Segal, P. Carruthers & K. Smith (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press

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Citations of this work BETA
Shane Nicholas Glackin (2008). Dolphin Natures, Human Virtues: Macintyre and Ethical Naturalism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 39 (3):292-297.
Monima Chadha (2007). No Speech, Never Mind! Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.
Louis M. Herman (2012). Body and Self in Dolphins. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):526-545.

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