Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons?

Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374 (2007)
Some philosophers think that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, or alternatively in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. This paper considers various possible interpretations of ‘responding correctly to reasons’ and of ‘responding correctly to beliefs about reasons’, and concludes that rationality consists in neither, under any interpretation. It recognizes that, under some interpretations, rationality does entail responding correctly to beliefs about reasons. That is: necessarily, if you are rational you respond correctly to your beliefs about reasons.
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DOI 10.1177/1740468107083249
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Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
Kieran Setiya (2014). What is a Reason to Act? Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.

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