Problems with the Dispositional Tracking Theory of Knowledge
Logos and Episteme 3 (3):505-507 (2012)
| Abstract | Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan attempt to improve on Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge by providing a modified, dispositional tracking theory. The dispositional theory, however, faces more problems than those previously noted by John Turri. First, it is not simply that satisfaction of the theory’s conditions is unnecessary for knowledge – it is insufficient as well. Second, in one important respect, the dispositional theory is a step backwards relative to the original tracking theory: the original but not the dispositional theory can avoid Gettier-style counterexamples. Future attempts to improve the tracking theory would be wise to bear these problems in mind. | |||||||||
| Keywords | epistemology analysis of knowledge Nozick Gettier Briggs Nolan safety and sensitivity Turri tracking theory | |||||||||
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