Online research in philosophy

I. A. Kieseppä''s criticism of the methodological use of the theory of verisimilitude, and D. B. Resnik''s arguments against the explanation of scientific method by appeal to scientific aims are critically considered. Since the notion of verisimilitude was introduced as an attempt to show that science can be seen as a rational enterprise in the pursuit of truth, defenders of the verisimilitude programme need to show that scientific norms can be interpreted (at least in principle) as rules that try to increase the degree of truthlikeness of scientific theories. This possibility is explored for several approaches to the problem of verisimilitude.

In The interpretation of dreams Freud famously claimed to have finally solved the riddle of dreams. Yet amidst all the heated debates and intense controversies that ensued in the wake of this groundbreaking work, one fundamental question has been entirely overlooked, namely: in what sense, exactly, are dreams analogous to riddles? It will be the burden of this paper to show that a critical investigation of this seemingly simple question reveals a fundamental and hereto unnoticed discrepancy between Freud's rhetoric on his method of dream interpretation and its application in practice. More specifically, whereas Freud argues that the psychoanalytic method can effectively solve the riddles of dreams by uncovering their pre-existing solutions, careful examination reveals that dream interpretations of this kind are the product of a very different solving technique, one that proceeds along a retroactive timeline rather than a linear one. Drawing on Wittgenstein's distinction between two kinds of riddles and the manner in which they are solved, I expound on the nature of retroactive riddle-solving, thus generating a distinctly different picture of psychoanalytic dream interpretation than the one envisioned and advocated by Freud.

This essay presents imaginary philosophical debates between Heidegger and Freud exploring their views on science, philosophy, their interrelationship and the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of Freud’s metapsychology. In the final section, Heidegger presents a series of criticisms of Freud’s theory, to which ‘Freud’ posthumously responds.

Though they met just once, and even then didn’t know what to make of each other’s work, Einstein and Freud had more in common than they might have imagined. Each ran out of evidence using the traditional scientific methods that had worked well since the dawn of the scientific revolution and each adopted new scientific methods that opened up unprecedented intellectual landscapes—relativity in Einstein’s case, the unconscious in Freud’s. In this brilliant, elegant book, renowned science writer Richard Panek traces the creation of two new sciences—cosmology and psychoanalysis—that have allowed us for more than a hundred years to explore previously unimaginable universes without and within. Like a nonfiction version of Einstein’s Dreams , Panek’s The Invisible Century is a story of a revolution in thought that altered not only what or how much we see, but also the very nature of seeing.

There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.

This paper argues that Adolf Gr nbaum's evaluation of the scientific status of psychoanalysis is marred by its failure to locate Freud's notion of natural science. Contrary to his claims, Griinbaum does not assess Freud's theory on Freud's own terms. The presuppositions that Griinbaum brings to the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis are problematic and his criticisms and methodological restrictions may not be defensible when psychoanalysis is taken to develop methodologically out of medical science rather than out of physics. I question the adequacy of the epistemological and methodological norms that Griinbaum brings to his analysis and I examine his arguments against the scientific credibility of Freud's theoretical claims. I argue that Griinbaum fails to consider the tension between clinical practice and psychoanalytic theory, ignores the evolution of Freud's thought and distorts and simplifies the complexity of the domain under investigation. Therefore his conclusions regarding the scientific credibility and evaluation of psychoanalysis are questionable.

Freud saw the dream as occupying a very important position in his theoretical model. If there were to be problems with his theoretical account of the dream then this would impinge upon proposed therapy and, of course, education as the right balance between the instincts and the institution of culture. Wittgenstein, whilst stating that Freud was interesting and important, raised several issues in relation to psychology/psychoanalysis, and to Freud in particular. Why would Wittgenstein have seen Freud as having some important things to say, even though he was sharply critical of Freud's claims to be scientific? The major issues to be considered in this paper are, in Section 1, the scientific status of Freud's work—was it science or was it more like philosophy than science; the analysis of dreams; rationality, and dreams and madness. Section 2 considers Freud and education, including the indignity of Freud's notion of 'the talking cure.' Section 3 considers psychoanalytic explanations not as theory but as a manner of speaking: 'une façon de parler.'.

The Interpretation of Dreams is often thought to be Freud's best book-length work. It was, indeed, Freud's first lengthy statement of a substantially original psychological theory. Freud wrote the book in the late 1890's and published it in 1900; it had a second edition in 1909, and thereafter many subsequent editions. By Freud's own account it was not well received by the scientific..

The guiding idea of Patricia Kitcher's Freud's Dream is that the use of interdisciplinary methodology accounts at the same time for the most central features of Freud's theory of the mind and for its most serious shortcomings. Kitcher proposes to provide an account of Freud's theory that illuminates its interdisciplinary underpinnings. While she indisputably succeeds in providing a subtle and rich reconstruction of Freud's work, her attempt to show up the limitations of interdisciplinary studies does not work. The value of her account is attributable not to the idea that Freud's was a flawed interdisciplinary endeavour but to a contextually and historically sensitive approach that makes explicit and elucidates the norms of explanation at work in his method of theory construction and that takes into account the multifaceted nature of his scientific practice.