David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 141 (1):21 - 42 (2008)
There are two doctrines for which Quine is particularly well known: the doctrine of ontological commitment and the inscrutability thesis—the thesis that reference and quantification are inscrutable. At first glance, the two doctrines are squarely at odds. If there is no fact of the matter as to what our expressions refer to, then it would appear that no determinate commitments can be read off of our best theories. We argue here that the appearance of a clash between the two doctrines is illusory. The reason that there is no real conflict is not simply that in determining our theories’ ontological commitments we naturally rely on our home language but also (and more importantly) that ontological commitment is not intimately tied to objectual quantification and a reference-first approach to language. Or so we will argue. We conclude with a new inscrutability argument which rests on the observation that the notion of objectual quantification, when properly cashed out, deflates.
|Keywords||Ontological commitment Inscrutability Quine Substitutional quantification Objectual quantification Rational requirement|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal (2013). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Bradley Rettler (2016). The General Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1405-1425.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
John A. Keller (forthcoming). Paraphrase and the Symmetry Objection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
George Duke & Peter Woelert (2016). Husserl and the Problem of Abstract Objects. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):27-47.
George Duke (2012). Abstract Singular Terms and Thin Reference. Theoria 78 (4):276-292.
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