Inconsistency theories of semantic paradox, by Douglas Patterson
Philosopher's Digest (2009)
| Abstract | Douglas Patterson argues that the best way to respond to the semantic paradoxes that arise in natural language is to take natural language semantics to be (explosively) inconsistent. According to Patterson, to understand a natural language is to share with others cognition of a false semantic theory. Patterson’s main argument runs as follows. English is expressively rich. So, the first sentence occurring in this review could be. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesAndrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
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Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387-422.
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