David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosopher's Digest (2009)
Douglas Patterson argues that the best way to respond to the semantic paradoxes that arise in natural language is to take natural language semantics to be (explosively) inconsistent. According to Patterson, to understand a natural language is to share with others cognition of a false semantic theory. Patterson’s main argument runs as follows. English is expressively rich. So, the first sentence occurring in this review could be.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
Dennis M. Patterson (1996). Law and Truth. Oxford University Press.
Graham Priest (1984). Semantic Closure. Studia Logica 43 (1-2):117 - 129.
Douglas Eden Patterson (2006). Tarski, the Liar, and Inconsistent Languages. The Monist 89 (1):150-177.
Douglas Patterson (2007). Inconsistency Theories: The Significance of Semantic Ascent. Inquiry 50 (6):575-589.
Thomas Hofweber (2010). Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5 (1).
Douglas Patterson (2007). Understanding the Liar. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press. 197.
Douglas Patterson (2009). Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Added to index2009-06-02
Total downloads44 ( #40,253 of 1,099,719 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #27,014 of 1,099,719 )
How can I increase my downloads?