Online research in philosophy

Logic is viewed by many as inseparable from rationality, and James' 'rejection of logic' in A Pluralistic Universe may be the most flagrantly 'irrational' strand in his philosophy. Nevertheless, when viewed in the context of the psychological naturalism developed in The Principles of Psychology, James' 'rejection of logic' can seem both plausible and, crucially, rational. James' rejection of conceptual logic is deeply connected to his naturalism about concepts, and his belief that there is no reason to think that an intellect "built up of practical interests" need develop concepts that accurately mirror the structure of reality. James position is, then, not so much that we should give up logic, but rather that (given the practical rather than theoretical nature of our concepts) we should give up the assumption that we are rationally obligated to accept all the apparent logical consequences of all the claims that we accept.

In this paper I examine parallels between C.S. Peirce's most mature account of signs and contemporary philosophy of language. I do this by first introducing a summary of Peirce's final account of Signs. I then use that account of signs to reconstruct Peircian answers to two puzzles of reference: The Problem of Cognitive Significance, or Frege's Puzzle; and The Same-Saying Phenomenon for Indexicals. Finally, a comparison of these Peircian answers with both Fregean and Direct Referentialist approaches to the puzzles highlights interesting parallels and important differences between Peirce's final account of signs, and the concepts used in analytic philosophy of language.

Foundations of the theory of signs.--Signs, language, and behavior.--Five semiotical studies.