Kantianism and Mere Means

Environmental Ethics 32 (3):267-284 (2010)
Few think that Kant’s moral theory can provide a defensible view in the area of environmental ethics because of Kant’s well-known insistence that all nonhumans are mere means. An examination of the relevant arguments, however, shows that they do not entitle Kant to his position. Moreover, Kant’s own Formula of Universal Law generates at least one important and basic duty which is owed both to human beings and to nonhuman animals. The resulting Kantian theory not only is sounder and more intuitive than the original, but also boasts some notable theoretical advantages over some of the most prominent views in environmental ethics
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DOI 10.5840/enviroethics201032331
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