Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality

Ethical Perspectives 12 (3):293-340 (2005)
The paper critically examines a series of objections to luck egalitarianism raised by Elizabeth Anderson in her essay “What is the Point of Equality?” According to Anderson, current egalitarian writing has come to be dominated by the distinction between choice and brute luck and that strict adherence to this distinction will mean treating some people in ways we have other egalitarian reasons not to want to treat them.A case is made for moving the debate on by adopting a pluralistic view of the fundamental egalitarian impulse that combines concerns about the influence on people’s lives of brute luck with more traditional egalitarian concerns. It is perfectly consistent with pluralistic egalitarianism to say that someone who faces social oppression or lacks effective access to valued functionings should receive public assistance even if not qua the victim of brute luck
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DOI 10.2143/EP.12.3.2004485
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Carl Knight (2013). Luck Egalitarianism. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
Joshua Preiss (2011). Disadvantage and an American Society of Equals. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (1):41-58.

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