Utilitas 22 (3):241-257 (
2010)
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Abstract
My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories – ideals and
aspirations – which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent
normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around
which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal
position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal.
I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral concepts such as duty,
virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally
significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue
ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model
of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal
formoral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required
imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility.