Making a Start with the stit Logic Analysis of Intentional Action

Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):499-530 (2011)
This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning the choices an agent intentionally exercises. Several axioms constraining the relations between these different modes of acting will be considered and discussed. The side effect problem will be analyzed as an interaction between knowingly doing and intentionally doing. Non-successful action will be analyzed as a weakening of the epistemic attitude towards action. Finally, the notion of ‘attempt’ will be briefly considered as a further weakening in this direction
Keywords Agency  Indeterminism  Action theory  Modal logic  Formal epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-011-9190-6
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.

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