David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):499-530 (2011)
This paper studies intentional action in stit logic. The formal logic study of intentional action appears to be new, since most logical studies of intention concern intention as a static mental state. In the formalization we distinguish three modes of acting: the objective level concerning the choices an agent objectively exercises, the subjective level concerning the choices an agent knows or believes to be exercising, and finally, the intentional level concerning the choices an agent intentionally exercises. Several axioms constraining the relations between these different modes of acting will be considered and discussed. The side effect problem will be analyzed as an interaction between knowingly doing and intentionally doing. Non-successful action will be analyzed as a weakening of the epistemic attitude towards action. Finally, the notion of ‘attempt’ will be briefly considered as a further weakening in this direction
|Keywords||Agency Indeterminism Action theory Modal logic Formal epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Nuel D. Belnap (2001). Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Nuel Belnap & Michael Perloff (1988). Seeing to It That: A Canonical Form for Agentives. Theoria 54 (3):175-199.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gabriel Sandu & Raimo Tuomela (1995). Joint Action and Group Action Made Precise. Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345.
Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser (1994). Intentional Action. Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2006). On Trying to Save the Simple View. Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.
Yair Levy (2013). Intentional Action First. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig (2008). A Logic of Intention and Attempt. Synthese 163 (1):45 - 77.
Joshua Shepherd (2014). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:15-26.
Hugh J. McCann (2005). Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Jason Turner (2004). Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):214-219.
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2005). Skill, Luck, Control, and Intentional Action. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):341 – 352.
Sarah K. Paul (2011). Deviant Formal Causation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3).
Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
Frank Hindriks (2008). Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):630-641.
Alfred R. Mele (1990). Exciting Intentions. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):289-312.
Added to index2011-07-21
Total downloads24 ( #67,651 of 1,096,245 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #126,669 of 1,096,245 )
How can I increase my downloads?