Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409 (2008)
Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.
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DOI 10.2307/40208633
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References found in this work BETA
John MacFarlane (2003). Future Contingents and Relative Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):321–336.
Mark Richard (2004). Contextualism and Relativism. Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):215-242.
Max Kolbel (2004). Faultless Disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53 - 73.
Max Kölbel (2004). Indexical Relativism Versus Genuine Relativism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):297 – 313.

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