Online research in philosophy

In this paper I discuss Tugendhat's moral philosophy by focusing on his conception of moral justification and the role sentiments play in it. In order to understand, and to criticize, the relationship between reasons and sentiments in Tugendhat's moral philosophy, the correlation between judgment and affection is scrutinized. Furthermore, I argue that as far as the innermost structure of morality is concerned individuals have far less autonomy to accept or reject any moral system than Tugendhat is prepared to admit. /// En este artículo discuto la filosofía moral de Tugendhat mediante la investigatión de su concepción de justificación moral y del papel que los sentimientos desempeñan en ella. Para comprender y criticar la relatión entre razones y sentimientos en la filosofía moral de Tugendhat, analizo la correlación entre juicio y afecto. Sostengo, además, que, en lo que atañe a la estructura más básica de la moralidad, los individuos tienen mucho menos autonomía para aceptar o rechazar un sistema moral de lo que Tugendhat está dispuesto a admitir.

Philosophical accounts of punishment are primarily concerned with punishment by the (or: a) state. More specifically, they attempt to explain why the (a) state may justifiably penalize those who are judged to violate its laws and the conditions under which it is entitled to do so. But any full account of these matters must surely be grounded in an account of the nature and purpose of the state and the justification of state authority. Because they are not so grounded, deterrence and retributive theories are incomplete as they are typically formulated. The intuitions behind these theories can be satisfied in a variety of complete theories, i.e., theories that understand the justification of punishment in relation to the justification of state authority. A consequence of this is that at least some of the intuitions underlying deterrence and retributive theories can be satisfied at the same time by a given theory.

Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, this essay shows that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. For this, the essay analyzes three defenses of sentimentalism against the relativism charge that a moral sense or moral sentiments vary across people, societies, cultures, or times. The first defense is the claim that there is a universal moral sense or universal moral sentiments. However, even if they exist, a moral sense or moral sentiments alone cannot identify appropriate morals. The second defense is to adopt a general viewpoint theory, which identifies moral principles by taking a general viewpoint. But it needs to employ reason, and even if not, it does not guarantee that we identify appropriate morals. The third defense is to adopt an ideal observer theory, which draws moral principles from sentimental reactions of an ideal observer. Yet it still does not show that a moral sense or moral sentiments alone can identify appropriate morals.

The most widespread interpretation amongst contemporary theorists of Kant's theory of punishment is that it is retributivist. On the contrary, I will argue there are very different senses in which Kant discusses punishment. He endorses retribution for moral law transgressions and consequentialist considerations for positive law violations. When these standpoints are taken into consideration, Kant's theory of punishment is more coherent and unified than previously thought. This reading uncovers a new problem in Kant's theory of punishment. By assuming a potential offender's intentional disposition as Kant does without knowing it for certain, we further exacerbate the opportunity for misdiagnosis.

This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'.

Abstract The central argument of this paper is that it is inconsistent to both morally educate children and to punish them. This is because the aims of punishment, according to the traditional theories, are, in the case of children, incompatible with the aims of moral education. Finally it is suggested that as no obvious general justification of the punishment of children is forthcoming, therefore the onus of justification must rest with those who, in a particular case, wish to punish children.

This book aims to answer the question of why, and by what right, some people punish others. With a groundbreaking new theory, Matravers argues that the justification of punishment must be embedded in a larger political and moral theory. He also uses the problem of punishment to undermine contemporary accounts of justice.

Punishment seems taboo both in modern education and in theory. In so far as philosophers of education engage with this problem they follow the pattern of the philosophy of law: consequentialism or deontology. This article starts from another perspective. Its starting point is that punishment in education and upbringing must be seen as an interactive moral process. Two conditions are considered which have to be fulfilled before one can speak of educative punishment: punishment assumes a relationship based both on trust and on authority. The connection between punishment, guilt and shame is analysed and a number of ideas on punishment are set against the back drop of moral development. The outcome of these considerations is a substantial restriction of the occasions in upbringing where punishment can make sense in educative terms.

A quick survey of the literature reveals that authors disagree as to which sentiments are moral and which are not, they disagee as to how to distinguish between moral and other sentiments, and finally that often the same author will claim a sentiment is moral at some times but not at others. These difficulties arise, I argue, from an underlying concept of emotion that I call atomism. Viewing emotions as means of coordination among agents, rather than as psychic atoms, suggests a radically different approach to the question of morality and affects, one where emotions pave the way for normative expectations.

The argument between retributivists and consequentialists about what morally justifies the punishment of offenders is incoherent. If we were to discover that all of the contending justifications were mistaken, there is no realistic prospect that this would lead us to abandon legal punishment. Justification of words, beliefs and deeds, can only be intelligible on the assumption that if one's justification were found to be invalid and there were no alternative justification, one would be prepared to stop saying, believing or doing what one has attempted to justify. Therefore, the moral standing or basis of our practices of punishing offenders can not rest on a justification of it.