Normative epistemology and naturalized epistemology

Inquiry 31 (1):53 – 78 (1988)
Abstract
A number of philosophers have argued that a naturalized epistemology cannot be normative, and thus that the norms that govern science cannot themselves be established empirically. Three arguments for this conclusion are here developed and then responded to on behalf of naturalized epistemology. The response is developed in three stages. First, if we view human knowers as part of the natural world, then the attempt to establish epistemic norms that are immune to scientific evaluation faces difficulties that are at least as severe as the purported difficulties for naturalized epistemology. Second, some examples of the ways in which norms are proposed and evaluated in the course of scientific research are considered and it is concluded that science has no need for trans?scientific norms. Finally, the three arguments introduced at the outset have no force when they are viewed in the light of the preceding discussion
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Harold I. Brown (1990). Prospective Realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):211-242.
Thomas E. Uebel (1991). Neurath's Programme for Naturalistic Epistemology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):623-646.
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