Non-inferential justification and epistemic circularity

Analysis 64 (4):339–348 (2004)
Abstract
Bergmann argues that we should accept epistemically circular reasoning since, he claims, it is a consequence of the plausible assumption that some justification is noninferential (Bergmann, M. "Epistemic Circularity, Malignant and Benign", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research forthcoming). I show that epistemically circular reasoning does not follow merely from the assumption that some justification is noninferential, but only from that view combined with the assumption of basic justification or knowledge. Thus, we have reason to endorse epistemically circular reasoning only to the extent that basic knowledge or justification can be defended
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    References found in this work BETA
    William P. Alston (1986). Epistemic Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.
    Stewart Cohen (2002). Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
    Martin Davies (2000). Externalism and Armchair Knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. 384--414.

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