Number words and ontological commitment

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):1–20 (2007)
Abstract
With the aid of some results from current linguistic theory I examine a recent anti-Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as ‘the number of moons of Jupiter is four’. I conclude that the anti-Fregean line with respect to these sentences is indefensible.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.465.x
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen Yablo (2001). Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):72–102.
Kent Bach (1999). The Myth of Conventional Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy 22 (4):327-366.
Jonathan Ginzburg (1995). Resolving Questions, I. Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (5):459 - 527.

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Citations of this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
Berit Brogaard (2009). What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):439 - 467.

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