David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110 (2007)
In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockham’s account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mind—specifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself.
|Keywords||Ockham Intentionality Concepts propositional attitudes scientia demonstration|
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References found in this work BETA
Victor Caston (1998). Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):249-298.
Susan Brower-Toland (2014). How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment. In G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press
Wilfrid Sellars (1963). 1991. In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview
Claude Panaccio (1999). And Mental Language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge 53.
Elizabeth Karger (1995). William of Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief. Vivarium 33 (2):171-196.
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