Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and the Problem of Intentionality

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):67-110 (2007)
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Abstract

In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockham’s account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mind—specifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself.

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Citations of this work

The Early Reception of Peter Auriol at Oxford.Rondo Keele - 2015 - Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 82:301-361.
Ockham's Scientia Argument for Mental Language.Eric W. Hagedorn - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 3:145-168.
The motivations for Walter Burley’s theory of the proposition.Nathaniel Bulthuis - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1057-1074.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Philosophy 59 (229):417-418.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.

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