Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:397 - 411 (1992)
| Abstract | Just what forms do (or should) our cognitive attitudes towards scientific theories take? The nature of cognitive commitment becomes particularly puzzling when scientists' commitments are) inconsistent. And inconsistencies have often infected our best efforts in science and mathematics. Since there are no models of inconsistent sets of sentences, straightforward semantic accounts fail. And syntactic accounts based on classical logic also collapse, since the closure of any inconsistent set under classical logic includes every sentence. In this essay I present some evidence that there really was a substantial cognitive commitment to OQT, and that some of its characteristics have a simple and straightforward explanation in terms of a model based on a form of paraconsistent logic. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGreg Restall (2002). Paraconsistency Everywhere. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):147-156.
Bryson Brown & Peter Schotch (1999). Logic and Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (3):265-288.
Graham Priest (1991). Minimally Inconsistent LP. Studia Logica 50 (2):321 - 331.
Heinrich Wansing (2006). Contradiction and Contrariety. Priest on Negation. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):81-93.
Joel M. Smith (1988). Scientific Reasoning or Damage Control: Alternative Proposals for Reasoning with Inconsistent Representations of the World. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:241 - 248.
Elias H. Alves (1984). Paraconsistent Logic and Model Theory. Studia Logica 43 (1-2):17 - 32.
Diderik Batens (2006). Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 91 (1):185-209.
Z. Weber (2011). A Paraconsistent Model of Vagueness. Mind 119 (476):1025-1045.
Peter K. Schotch (1992). Paraconsistent Logic: The View From the Right. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:421 - 429.
Peter Vickers (2009). Can Partial Structures Accommodate Inconsistent Science? Principia 13 (2):233-250-.
Bryson Brown (1999). Yes, Virginia, There Really Are Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):489-500.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2011-05-29Total downloads1 ( #274,982 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
