Online research in philosophy

Electronic journal (e-journal) publishing has started to change the ways we think about publish-ing. However, many scholars and scientists in the mind and brain sciences are still ignorant of the new possibilities and on-going debates. This paper will provide a summary of the issues in-volved, give an update of the current discussion, and supply practical information on issues re-lated to e- journal publishing and self-archiving relevant for the mind and brain sciences. Issues such as differences between traditional and e-journal publishing, open archive initiatives, world-wide conventions, quality control, costs involved in e-journal publishing, and copyright questions will be addressed. Practical hints on how to self-archive, how to submit to the e-journal Psycolo-quy, how to create an open research archive, and where to find information relevant to e-publishing will be supplied.

It is important to appreciate how the battle between multiculturalist and individualist theories of education ahs shaped the pedagogical advice that some institutions of higher learning now give their instructors. In an important sense, that advice invites college and university teachers to pursue conflicting, irreconcilable goals in their teaching. By examining a particular North American example of such advice, I try to explain why the understandable attempt to accommodate both multiculturalism and individualism in the classroom inevitably makes for incoherent pedagogy.

Beware of economists bearing advice. Though some of it is valuable, the framework of theoretical welfare economics from which economic advice usually issues has serious normative limitations and distortions. When economists go beyond identifying consequences of policies to making recommendations, they typically rely on a theory whose only normative concern is welfare and its distribution and that mistakenly identifies welfare with the satisfaction of preferences. Their advice about how to increase welfare must accordingly be regarded with caution, and policy makers must not forget that increasing welfare should not be their only goal.

Abstract Many projects in contemporary philosophy are artifactual puzzles of no abiding significance, but it is treacherously easy for graduate students to be lured into devoting their careers to them, so advice is proffered on how to avoid this trap.

This article by one of the Editors of Bioethics, published in the 25th anniversary issue of the journal, describes some of the revolutionary changes academic publishing has undergone during the last decades. Many humanities journals went from typically small print-runs, counting by the hundreds, to on-line availability in thousands of university libraries worldwide. Article up-take by our subscribers can be measured efficiently. The implications of this and other changes to academic publishing are discussed. Important ethical challenges need to be addressed in areas such as the enforcement of plagiarism-related policies, the so-called ‘impact factor’ and its impact on academic integrity, and the question of whether on-line only publishing can currently guarantee the integrity of academic publishing histories.

On the first two pages of a book called Bridge Made Easy, one finds the following advice: if you have a balanced hand with 16–18 high-card points and an ace, king, or queen in at least three of the four suits, then your bid should be ‘1 No Trump’. What makes this advice good (assuming that it is) are certain underlying justifying considerations—considerations about balancing the conflicting aims of (1) winning very many points, if one makes one’s bid (which would favor very ambitious bidding) and (2) minimizing the probability of not winning any points at all, because of not making one’s bid (which would favor minimally conservative bidding). Some players give only as much weight to this advice as they do to its underlying justifying considerations: they ‘look through’ the advice to the reasons behind it. Others take the advice more seriously, giving it more weight in their deliberations than they would give simply to the considerations on which it is based. The difference between the players’ two ways of regarding this advice marks the boundary of the central concept in Goldman’s new book.

Company directors and executives seek legal advice outside the company on a regular basis. This advice is meant to be given within the context of the lawyers’ professional obligations and ethical practise. What clients may not appreciate is there is often a conflict of interest between the lawyers’ professional and ethical concerns and the legal advice business. If lawyers follow their business interests, their advice may be incomplete especially in relation to the ethical consequences of that advice. This could lead to a compromise of the clients’ commercial interests and even raise doubts in relation to the legality of the clients’ proposed course of action.

This paper launches a new criticism of Michael Smith's advice model of internalism. Whereas Robert Neal Johnson argues that Smith's advice model collapses into the example model of internalism, the author contends that taking advice seriously pushes us instead toward some version of externalism. The advice model of internalism misportrays the logic of accepting advice. Agents do not have epistemic access to what their fully rational selves would advise them to do, and so it is necessary for a model of practical reason based upon advice to reflect the fact that agents take advice only from other people. This fact may or may not support internalism. Whether it does depends upon the content of the good adviser's advice, something we cannot know unless we ourselves are fully rational. We see in a new way, then, how the internalism/externalism debate depends upon the content of practical reason.