Primitive knowledge disjunctivism

Philosophical Issues 21 (1):45-73 (2011)
I argue that McDowell-style disjunctivism, as the position is often cashed out, goes wrong because it takes the good epistemic standing of veridical perception to be grounded in “manifest” facts which do not necessarily satisfy any epistemic constraints. A better form of disjunctivism explains the difference between good and bad cases in terms of epistemic constraints that the states satisfy. This view allows us to preserve McDowell’s thesis that good cases make facts manifest, as long as manifest facts must satisfy epistemic constraints.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2011.00197.x
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Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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