David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38 (2009)
We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its hey elements are, fast, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositioned attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience
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Raphaël Fiorese (2016). Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa. Erkenntnis 81 (2):201-229.
Kerry McKenzie (forthcoming). Relativities of Fundamentality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
James Ladyman (2011). The Scientistic Stance: The Empirical and Materialist Stances Reconciled. Synthese 178 (1):87 - 98.
Nicholas Schroeder (2015). A Physicalistic Account of Emergentism. Axiomathes 25 (4):479-494.
Andrew Melnyk (2014). Pereboom's Robust Non-Reductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 79 (5):1191-1207.
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