Perspectival truth and color primitivism

In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1--34 (2010)
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Abstract

Perspectivalism is a semantic theory according to which the contents of utterances and mental states (perhaps of a particular kind) have a truth-value only relative to a particular perspective (or standard) determined by the context of the speaker, assessor, or bearer of the mental state. I have defended this view for epistemic terms, moral terms and predicates of personal taste elsewhere (Brogaard 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming a). The main aim of this paper is to defend perspectivalism about color perception and color discourse. The content of color perception and color discourse, I will argue, has a truth-value only relative to an appropriate viewing condition and the perceiver, or a perceiver deferred to.

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Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

What Are Centered Worlds?Shen-yi Liao - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):294-316.
Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
Relativity and Degrees of Relationality.Jack Spencer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):432-459.
Colour Eliminativism or Colour Relativism?Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):305 - 321.

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References found in this work

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.

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