David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
We propose to extend a reliabilist perspective from epistemology to the very concept of rational justification. Rationality is defined as a cognitive virtue contextually relative to an information domain, to the mean performance of a cognitive community, and to normal conditions of information gathering. This proposal answers to the skeptical position derived from the evidence of the cognitive fallacies and, on the other hand, is consistent with the ecological approach to the cognitive biases. Rationality is conceived naturalistically as a control system of the flow of information: reliabilism is the approach that qualifies this system as virtuous. There can be specific-domain devices selected by evolution, although the constraints of the very flow of information can be also represented, even with imperfect means of formalization, and then rationality becomes reflective. Reliable rationality is postulated in conclusion as a more philosophically abstract concept than maximal, minimal or bounded rationality
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (2008). The Virtue of Practical Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):1-33.
Thomas Sturm (2012). The “Rationality Wars” in Psychology: Where They Are and Where They Could Go. Inquiry 55 (1):66-81.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Edward Stein (1996). Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.
Isabella Muzio (2001). Emotions and Rationality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):135-145.
Gerd Gigerenzer (1991). On Cognitive Illusions and Rationality. In Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 225-249.
Frederic Laville (2000). Foundations of Procedural Rationality: Cognitive Limits and Decision Processes. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):117-138.
Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler (2012). Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality. [REVIEW] Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm (2012). How (Far) Can Rationality Be Naturalized? Synthese 187 (1):243-268.
Robert V. Bartlett (1986). Ecological Rationality: Reason and Environmental Policy. Environmental Ethics 8 (3):221-239.
Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The a Priori Rules of Rationality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):113-131.
Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (2004). Introduction: Aspects of Rationality. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads7 ( #213,168 of 1,679,298 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #48,280 of 1,679,298 )
How can I increase my downloads?