David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):169 – 189 (2007)
The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting-point the suggestion that C causes E iff (C E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (E C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre-emption. It is found that the 'reversed' counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre-emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell Publishers.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Broadbent (2012). Causes of Causes. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):457-476.
Molly Gardner (2016). Beneficence and Procreation. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):321-336.
Alex Broadbent (2008). The Difference Between Cause and Condition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):355-364.
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