Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):131–166 (2006)
The categorial concepts of substance (thing) and substance (stuff) are described, and the conceptual relationships between things and their constitutive stuff delineated. The relationship between substance concepts, expressed by other count-nouns, and natural kind concepts is examined. Artefacts and their parts are argued to be substances, whereas parts of organisms are not. The confusions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers who invoked the concept of substance are adumbrated
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2006.00142.x
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1975). Identity and Predication. Journal of Philosophy 72 (13):343-363.
D. H. Mellor (1997). Properties and Predicates. In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. OUP Oxford
John W. Cook (1968). Hume's Scepticism with Regard to the Senses. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1):1 - 17.

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